Introduction
Much of Catholic social teaching provides a cohesive real-world framework for the Church's anthropological truth claims concerning some of the most deeply divisive issues facing modern society, including abortion, homosexuality, workers' rights, the death penalty, and euthanasia. By comparison, subsidiarity's reminder that "needs are best understood and satisfied by people who are closest to them" 1 seems an oasis of calm, situated beyond culture war controversy and not subject to vehement resistance by any significant faction along the ideological spectrum. Standing alone, subsidiarity can be read simply as calling for social problems to be addressed at the local level to the extent local bodies can address a given problem effectively. Understood as a strictly political principle, the only grounds for dispute will be over the normative definition and empirical verification of effectiveness. Beyond that, the doctrine seems so broadly stated as to be of nearly universal appeal. Indeed, as an ideal that has been embraced openly by both the Bush Administration and the European Union, 2 its acceptance among cultural power brokers appears beyond question.
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After all, who reasonably could challenge the notion that families, neighborhoods, and towns should address needs within their respective spheres, and higher forms of authority should step in only as needed? Especially in the United States, such a bottomup vision of self-governance is embedded in our national fabric, and hardly needs a seal of approval from the Catholic Church. Even the most rabid fans of the modern welfare state would be hard-pressed to welcome the prospect of a government superagency taking exclusive reins over the provision of food, child care, education and all other social needs through anonymous bureaucrats, obviating the need for any subgroups standing between the all-encompassing state and the fully atomized individual. At the same time, even the staunchest opponents of centralized government must concede that at least some collectively channeled exercises of political authority are prudent, even if only for national defense or the protection of private property.
Like much of Catholic social teaching, however, subsidiarity's seeming vacuity arises only when the doctrine is shorn from its surrounding web of truth claims; therein lies its vulnerability to secular domestication. This article seeks to recapture the radical edge of subsidiarity by reconnecting its localizing framework with the substantive anthropological vision of solidarity. Understood in this context, subsidiarity reveals itself as a proposition that is fundamentally subversive to the hyperindividualist norms espoused and increasingly enforced by the liberal state. Specifically, subsidiarity calls for individuals and communities to recognize the objective value of the human person as they strive to meet the needs of those around them.
This call stands in direct opposition to modern America's brand of liberalism, which appears to value consumer autonomy above all else and increasingly seems willing to collectivize its consumerist norms by legally precluding the exercise of moral agency by providers of certain goods and services. In this regard, the maintenance of subsidiarity's framework will require a vigorous defense of moral autonomy beyond that of the consumer. This takes us into the realm of value pluralism, for the surrounding society's emerging conception of the common good appears unlikely to embrace such a defense. In other words, for subsidiarity to continue facilitating the common good as conceived of by Catholic social teaching, society must be persuaded to make room for multiple conceptions of the good, not simply seek to collectivize the Church's anthropologically authentic conception.
Admittedly, this is no simple endeavor, and will require some careful unpacking and exploration. In Part II(A) of this article, I address the conceptions of social power underlying the emerging collectivization of consumerist and individualist norms in the American legal system, as contrasted, in Part II(B), with the implications of subsidiarity for the exercise of power. Given the disconnect between subsidiarity's premise and the prevailing public vision of the common good, Part III explores the philosophical presumptions and political ramifications of value pluralism, in particular their compatibility with the Christian worldview. Finally, Part IV examines potential avenues by which Catholic social teaching can most effectively engage a consumerist culture. Put simply, the thrust of this article is that subsidiarity is doubly subversive: it subverts the state's efforts to collectivize individualist norms, but it also may subvert religious voices' efforts to collectivize norms grounded in the moral anthropology.
II. Subsidiarity and Social Power
Subsidiarity, at base, concerns the exercise of power in society -not just who exercises it, but how it is exercised in light of the reality of the human person.
Procedurally, it opposes the relentless centralization of power within modern society, but does not disregard the human-affirming capacity of that centralization in its more prudent forms. Substantively, subsidiarity looks for power to be exercised not with the ultimate aim of maximizing individual autonomy, but of furthering authentic human development.
Both aspects speak prophetically to the conception of power pursued by the modern liberal state.
A. Individualism as Collectivism
The rise of democracy did not, of course, signal the end of oppression. As recognized by Isaiah Berlin, " [d] emocracy may disarm a given oligarchy, a given privileged individual or set of individuals, but it can still crush individuals as mercilessly as any previous ruler." 3 A broader proof on the same theme is made persuasively in Bernard de Jouvenel's groundbreaking 1945 exposition of state power, which traces the history of centralized power in society, noting that the centralization of power has exploded with the rise of the democratic state. He explains that power's make-up includes "an egoistical urge combined with the will to serve society," and it is "through the interplay of these two antithetical principles that the tendency of Power is towards occupying an ever larger place in society; the various conjectures beckon it on at the same time its appetite is driving it to fresh pastures." 4 One component of modern society's homage to democratic norms is the assumption that democratic rights form a meaningful limit on state power. In fact, the opposite is evident once we understand that pre-democratic rulers had nothing approaching the power of the modern state. "It is not true," de Jouvenel writes, "that mankind has emerged from a former state in which magistrates and monarchs dictated out of their own heads the rules of the behaviour," for "[t]hey had not in truth a vestige of such a right, or, more accurately perhaps, of such a power." 5 As such, "[t]he assents of people or assembly, so far from fettering for the rulers a freedom to act which they never had, made possible an extension of governmental authority."
6 Especially significant to our inquiry is de Jouvenel's recognition that the rise of the collective is portrayed, and popularly perceived, as the rise of the individual. He observes that the growth of state power "strikes private individuals as being not so much a continual encroachment on their liberty as an attempt to put down the various petty tyrannies to which they have been subjected. As the Church has recognized, the Enlightenment conception of freedom tends to posit a human subject "whose finality is the satisfaction of his own interests in the enjoyment of earthly goods." 9 Increasingly, consumer freedom is being elevated as a non-negotiable collective ideal and enforced through the coercive power of the state. In particular, the state has taken upon itself the responsibility to compel providers to honor the individual's decisions in matters of consumption, regardless of how morally problematic those decisions might be from the provider's perspective. Examples of this trend abound, and are especially obvious in areas that are viewed as essential public goods in modern American life such as health care, education, and law.
In the health care arena, reproductive and religious freedoms came into direct conflict recently in California, and reproductive freedom emerged victorious. The state legislature passed a law requiring employers who provide prescription drug coverage to their employees to cover contraceptives. The law included a religious exemption, but this was drawn narrowly, defining "religious employer" as employers whose purpose is to inculcate religious values, who primarily employ persons of the employer's same faith, pharmacists should be legally required to provide the "morning-after" emergency contraception pill. 14 These new points of contention, whatever their outcome, reflect the degree to which consumer preferences are the driving force behind the creation and expansion of legal norms.
Educational providers, by comparison, appear to enjoy substantially unfettered institutional autonomy in pursuing their missions through the shaping of a distinct educational environment. Certainly American law is no stranger to the imposition of collective educational ideals, but historically these have been motivated by animus against a particular group (Catholics, most notably), 15 rather than the abstract elevation of the individual student's purported well-being. But this may be changing as well, and the change may be imposed through a path actually intended to enhance educational freedom.
To some, the school choice movement represents the hope of meaningful educational freedom, as families would be equipped through school vouchers to attend private schools that they otherwise would be unable to afford financially. Such a vision of school choice is expressly embodied in Catholic social thought, which reminds us of the centrality of the family in educational decisions and reminds the state that it "cannot without injustice merely tolerate so-called private schools" because "[s]uch schools render a public service and therefore have a right to financial assistance."
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The embrace of this vision is far from universal, of course, and to many, the school choice movement represents the most promising path toward state regulation of private schools. In a market where school vouchers are prevalent, a school will be hardpressed to keep its tuition levels competitive without the subsidy of voucher money. At a minimum, religious schools whose missions compel them to maintain educational access among a variety of economic classes will need to accept vouchers in order to remain viable in the market. And with the vouchers will come, almost invariably, government regulation.
For our purposes, it is important to recognize that proposed regulations for voucher schools are justified based on the purported best interest of the student. This is a collectivist twist on the consumerist ideology, for the child as consumer is not able to realize or articulate, much less act on, her own best interests. As a result, the state takes on the role of identifying and protecting the student's best interests on her behalf, albeit on a collective scale. As James Dwyer explains, "states must attach to vouchers whatever regulatory strings are needed to ensure that children in all private schools receive a good secular education," and if this means that "some parents cannot use their children's schooling to proclaim the 'good news,' because in the state's judgment the parents' news is not so good, then so be it."
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Many proposed regulations, some of which have already adopted in voucher districts, seem relatively innocuous, but by no means unobjectionable, such as mandating certain curricular requirements, requiring teachers to be state-certified, ensuring that religious instruction or services are optional for voucher students, and prohibiting the use of religious criteria in the admission of students. Others are more problematic, most notably the power to censor the transmission of illiberal religious teachings. Whatever our view of a particular regulation's reasonableness, the content is not as significant as the underlying notion that the state is equipped to define and pursue collectively the student consumer's interests, even at the expense of the educational providers' institutional autonomy and the efficacy of parents' child-forming decisions.
The law's elevation of the consumer extends to the legal profession itself. understanding, that all texts must be capable of being translated into the language which the adherents of modernity speak to each other," 27 modern liberalism expects all sources of authority and commitment to self-translate into the language of preferences in order to be recognized in the public sphere. Not surprisingly, obligations steeped in robust notions of moral agency may not fare well in the public sphere, especially when their recognition requires the denial of the more straightforward preference claim of the individual consumer. In effect, modern liberalism offers this response to Catholic employers: if you oppose the use of contraceptives, you will never be forced, as consumers, to use them; but you are not allowed to preclude (or even hinder) other consumers from reaching a contrary decision on the matter. Neutrality on questions of the good is purportedly assured, but only to the extent that those questions drive an individual's decisions of consumption and do not impinge on them.
B. Subsidiarity as Relationship
Modern liberalism, especially in its theories of justice and the social good, tends to view the individual as a decontextualized rational agent, standing apart from the formative influence of others. Subsidiarity responds to this atomistic anthropology by reminding us that the human person is, above all, relational -not just as an empirical description but as a normative claim. And this relational nature must shape not only our theoretical vision of society, but our practical responses to everyday social problems.
The Church's teaching on this point has been consistent throughout its history, with Saint 27 Id. at 327.
Augustine's thought being just one notable example, as explicated by Jean Bethke Elshtain:
We cannot 'combine many relationships' in one single self; rather, our 'connections should be separated and spread among individuals, and that in this way they should help to bind social life more effectively by involving in their plurality a plurality of persons. . . . Thus affection stretches over a greater number.' The social tie radiates out from kinship groups to ever widening circles of sociability; near and far, distant and intimate. There is something mysterious about all this, about what Augustine calls an 'inherent sense of decency.' Any society that loses this sense of decency is a society in very big trouble, indeed. It is a society that has repudiated, whether tacitly or explicitly, the ground of human being and of human being-among-others.
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The doctrine of subsidiarity embodies the Church's recognition of the "human being-among-others," and it reflects the conviction that the individual's relationship to others cannot be captured simply by conceiving of her as a preference-expressing participant in the political process or the free market. The importance of the free, meaningful, and efficacious operation of these institutions presents the "most weighty principle" of subsidiarity:
Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do. For every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help to the members of the body social, and never destroy or absorb them.
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This fundamental ordering "must be respected" because "needs are best understood and satisfied by people who are closest to them and who act as neighbours to those in need," a perception that derives, in turn, from the fact that "certain kinds of demands often call for a response which is not simply material but which is capable of perceiving the deeper human need." Viewed in its broader context, then, subsidiarity does not just stand for the prudent devolution of government authority, but provides a framework for the ordering of society that allows solidarity's vision of the human person to be realized. In the context of our preference-maximizing market orientation, the practice of solidarity requires that service providers honor the dignity of the consumer, which is not coextensive with the autonomy of the consumer. Solidarity, then, can only be realized to the extent that service providers are empowered to meet needs in ways that diverge from, or even defy, 45 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Christian Freedom and Liberation ¶ 26 (1986) .
the overarching norms of the collective -i.e., solidarity is not possible without a public sphere that accepts the premise of subsidiarity.
That acceptance appears very much in question if the current trend holds. By harnessing individualist norms to the driving force of collectivism, modern liberalism has set out on a course that trumps any effort by service providers to pursue the common good through their own relationships with the consumer. By requiring Catholic Charities, for example, to provide contraceptives to its employees or else cease offering health care coverage of prescription drugs altogether, the state forces the organization to defy its own conception of the good by either facilitating sin or foregoing the obligation to provide for those within its care. We are left with a purely individualist sense of morality, as actors are permitted to concern themselves only with their own morally laden choices of consumption, not with their morally laden choices of provision. Value pluralism's rise to prominence in the latter twentieth century was driven, in significant part, by the carnage that had already inexorably defined the century. As
Berlin framed its foundation, One belief, more than any other, is responsible for the slaughter of individuals on the altars of the great historical ideals -justice or progress or the happiness of future generations, or the sacred mission or emancipation of a nation or race or class, or even liberty itself, which demands the sacrifice of individuals for the freedom of society. This is the belief that somewhere, in the past or in the future, in divine revelation or in the mind of an individual thinker, in the pronouncements of history or science, or in the simple heart of an uncorrupted good man, there is a final solution. This ancient faith rests on the conviction that all the positive values in which men have believed must, in the end, be compatible, and perhaps even entail one another.
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If, by contrast, "the ends of men are many, and not all of them are in principle compatible with each other," then conflict is invariably part of the human experience.
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The firm conviction that human conflict could neither be escaped nor transcended by appeal to an overarching theory of history, human nature, or divine will led Berlin to distinguish negative from positive forms of liberty. Negative, or "freedom from," forms recognize claims of entitlement to non-interference with one's pursuit of the good, however the good is defined by the pursuer. Berlin and other value pluralists, this can be problematic.
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Of course, Catholic social teaching does not categorically reject the prospect of positive liberty, especially when it comes to the state's obligation to assist the poor, but the Church's consistent emphasis on the essential role played by mediating structures 54 BERLIN, supra note __, at 212.
55 Id. at 214.
56 Id. at 216 ("Pluralism, with the measure of 'negative' liberty that it entails, seems to me a truer and more humane ideal than the goals of those who seek in the great disciplined, authoritarian structures the ideal of 'positive' self-mastery by classes, or peoples, or the whole of mankind.").
warrants a cautionary stance toward positive liberties. Gray's reliance on political resolutions of contested issues may seem promising to those who are tired of losing "culture war" battles through perceived judicial activism at the expense of democratic give and take. But exclusive reliance on politics may be a more troublesome cure than the ailment of a rights-driven public discourse, as reflected in the political outcome of the contraceptives battle in California, or in survey data on results of long chains of reasoning which unavoidably invoke contested judgments about human interests and well-being."). o decide rationally among competing options is to represent these in terms of the units of pleasure they produce, and to select that option that produces the most pleasure units," is problematic from a value-pluralist view because "it fails dismally to appreciate the distinctiveness, the radical plurality of values."); GALSTON, supra note __, at 33 ("From a pluralist perspective . . . the core problem is that utilitarianism fails to take seriously the heterogeneity of values. The burden of proof is on utilitarians (and ethical monists of all kinds) to show how the apparent diversity of values can be translated into a single vocabulary of value without loss of moral meaning.").
This is not to suggest that value pluralism and Catholic social teaching are kindred spirits, of course. For all the potential benefits accompanying the pluralist take on society, the downside must not be sugarcoated. Years ago, John Courtney Murray warned society of the appearance of the barbarian who "untutored in the high tradition of civility, who goes busily and happily about his work, a domesticated and law-abiding man, engaged in the construction of a philosophy to put an end to all philosophy, and thus put an end to the possibility of a vital consensus and to civility itself." 97 In Murray's view, the barbarian's work is "to undermine rational standards of judgment, to corrupt the inherited intuitive wisdom by which the people have always lived, and to do this not by spreading new beliefs but by creating a climate of doubt and bewilderment in which clarity about the larger aims of life is dimmed and the self-confidence of the people is destroyed."
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As highlighted by Murray's caution, the obstacle for Christians contemplating an embrace of the pluralist vision of society lies in the proposition of value pluralism as a truth claim. The leading value pluralists sketch a vision of the world that reflects a metaphysical disconnect from the presumptions animating Catholic social teaching, as seen in Gray's description of incommensurability:
Incommensurability marks imperfection neither in our understanding nor in the world; rather it signifies the incoherence of the very idea of perfection. Incommensurability is not, then, the Augustinian idea of the imperfectability of human things, which is a familiar cliché of conservative thought; it is the radical denial of the very meaning of 96 GRAY, supra note __ (Isaiah Berlin), at 41.
JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 24 (Image Books 1964) (1960).
98 Id.
perfection. For religions . . . in which the idea of the perfection of the deity or of the world, the project of theodicy and the idea that there is one way of life that is right or best for all human beings, are centrally important, this may be a result of no small importance.
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Indeed, the truth claim of value pluralism is not just a question of semantics, but informs the prescription of pluralist theorists. Liberals like Raz focus on choice as having value only as it leads to rational autonomy, which may or may not be compatible with religious truth. But a pluralist like George Crowder goes further, explaining that "a genuinely pluralist chooser cannot accept as decisive [a] predetermined rule of conduct,"
for pluralists "must be prepared to interrogate not only their desires but also the authority of rules that purport to regulate desires. [B]oth Lewis and Hauerwas believe that there are moral truths and that people can know them. . . . Furthermore, both of them agree that disagreement on moral issues occurs from one person or culture or period to the next, that some of this disagreement is very hard to resolve by rational means, and that failure to resolve such disagreement sometimes leads to tragic consequences -like resort to warfare.
Both authors would affirm the rationality of morals, if this means that we are entitled to go on using the notions of moral truth and justification with confidence, the facts of moral disagreement notwithstanding. Lewis, however, would suspect that Hauerwas's way of stressing diversity and the dependence of moral reasoning upon particular cultural traditions makes it too hard to defend this affirmation. And Hauerwas would suspect that Lewis's talk of a transcultural natural law unwittingly invites nihilism or skepticism by making it seem as if the objectivity or rationality of morals depended on something that turns out, on examination, to be a fiction. Both then would worry that the other does something that invites nihilistic or skeptical doubts -the one by providing so little universal grounding for moral reasoning that it threatens to collapse, the other by requiring more universal grounding than could ever be supplied.
Any attempt to articulate Catholicism's stance toward value pluralism, whether in its weaker or stronger versions, must also explore the work of Charles Taylor. Taylor argues persuasively that pluralism is embodied in Christianity, given that "[r]edemption happens through Incarnation, the weaving of God's life into human lives, but these human lives are different, plural, irreducible to each other."
109 And while the reconciliation that redemption brings is "a kind of oneness," it is "the oneness of diverse beings who come to see that they cannot attain wholeness alone, that their complementarity is essential, rather than of beings who come to accept that they are ultimately identical." 110 Catholicism, as envisioned by Taylor, embodies a unity-acrossdifference, rather than a unity-through identity, not because "the human material, with which God's life is interwoven, imposes this formula as a kind of second-best solution to 123 Id. at 36-37.
IV. Toward a Pluralist Engagement of Culture
When we talk about defending the ability of individuals and communities to live in fidelity to their religiously informed conceptions of the good, we are talking about, in Nancy Rosenblum's term, "integralism," which she defines as the push by religious believers "to be able to conduct themselves according to the injunctions of religious law and authority in every sphere of everyday life, and to see their faith mirrored in public If the import of pluralism is to be taken seriously -as I believe it must for subsidiarity to be more than a noble relic of some Tocquevillean image of America -our focus should be on carving out and defending space within the public sphere for the pursuit of plural moral values. For the providers of public goods, such space is a shrinking middle ground between the rapidly converging pincers of individualist consumerism and aggressive collectivism. But once Catholics carve out a sphere of autonomy for their illiberal norms, they are hard-pressed to turn around and hijack the power of state coercion in furtherance of those norms.
Pluralism is no stranger to Catholic thought and teaching, evidenced most famously in the work of John Courtney Murray, who emphasized the distinction between the common good and public order. He explained that " [t] he common good includes all the social goods, spiritual and moral as well as material, which man pursues here on earth in accord with the demands of his personal and social nature," and its pursuit "devolves upon society as a whole, on all its members and on all its institutions." 127 By contrast, "[p]ublic order, whose care devolves upon the state, is a narrower concept," and consists of three goods "which can and should be achieved by the power which is proper to the state -the power inherent in the coercive discipline of public law." 128 Two of the goods -public peace and justice -are not controversial, but the third, public morality, is at the crux of our inquiry. The key to Murray's analysis is his suggestion that public morality be "determined by moral standards commonly accepted among the people." 129 In
American culture today, where public morality is defined largely in terms of the quest for individual autonomy, Murray's work seems to stand in some tension with subsidiarity, and indeed could be twisted in an attempt to justify Catholic Charities falling in line with the public consensus on the importance of access to contraceptives.
At the time Murray was writing, of course, he was concerned primarily with laying the theoretical groundwork for creating space between secular law and Church teachings. At issue was the extent to which a pluralist society could legitimately deviate from religious truth, not the extent to which the collective mechanisms of a pluralist society could preclude its members from adhering to religious truth. In other words, Murray was focused more on reining in the collectivizing capacity of Church teaching than on constructing a robust defense against the collectivizing impulse of secular society.
This is not to suggest that the Church must withdraw into a strictly defensive mode when it enters the public policy arena, although undoubtedly there will be more frequent cause for Catholics to engage in the rights discourse of which they have tended to be skeptical. 130 Certainly top-down economic initiatives do not raise the same concerns as top-down enforcement of contested moral claims. 131 But even on questions of morality, Pope John Paul II's work ably reflects that some moral truths are nonnegotiable, even in the pluralist public sphere. 132 The debate over the recriminalization of abortion, to take the most prominent example, cannot be understood simply as an attempt to close out alternative conceptions of the good through state coercion, but stands as an unavoidably collective conversation to determine which members of society have standing even to enter into the pursuit of the good. Whatever stance someone takes on the ultimate determination, the determination itself -that a fetus either possesses or lacks such standing -must be enforced through the coercive mechanisms of the state; to devolve the conversation to individuals and subcommunities is to answer it definitively in the negative. The death penalty is similarly situated. As Greg Kalscheur explains in his recent exploration of Murray's jurisprudence, "reason compels civil society to seek the common good and to recognize that the effort to secure some aspects of the common good may require the help of the state acting through the coercive force of law." Many reasonable and faithful adherents to Catholic social teaching will disagree over the range of anthropologically authentic moral claims that are not subject to compromise under the pluralist paradigm. Without question, such an exercise entails line-drawing, and the lines' placement will be disputed vigorously. The point of this article is not to articulate some sort of blueprint that resolves these disputes, but simply to suggest that, if we take subsidiarity seriously, we will be very cautious in collectivizing our conception of the good. Subsidiarity subverts modern liberalism's attempts to collectivize the consumerist norms of individualism; but its practical premise stands for a broader localization of moral authority, even where the collectivist impetus is substantively laudable. If we claim that subsidiarity renders localization in a particular context valid only to the extent that the local body's approach contributes to the common good, as defined by the truth claims of the moral anthropology, we have emptied subsidiarity of its real-world meaning. If localization's validity is measured against a standard derived from a contested vision of the good, subsidiarity becomes a simple prop, justifying whatever vision of the good happens to hold sway in the political and legal spheres.
This by no means is to suggest that supporters of subsidiarity are to abandon the front lines in the cultural contests of moral values. Just as a top-down imposition of morality is problematic from the standpoint of subsidiarity, so too is the prospect of a "naked public square." 135 The pluralist impetus, taken to the extreme, is prone to push faith to the sidelines of public life, as illustrated by Alasdair MacIntyre's story of the modern university:
When universities without religious tests were founded or religious tests were abolished in universities formerly enforcing them, the consequence was not that such universities became places of ordered intellectual conflict within which the contending and alternative points of view of rival traditions of enquiry could be systematically elaborated and evaluated. Had this been the case, unity of belief would have been replaced by a multiplicity of contending beliefs, each permitted to provide its own framework for enquiry. Instead, what happened was that in the appointment of university teachers considerations of belief and allegiance were excluded from view altogether. A conception of scholarly competence, independent of standpoint, was enforced in the making of appointments. A corresponding conception of objectivity in the classroom required the appointed teachers to present what they taught as if there were indeed shared standards of rationality, accepted by all teachers and accessible to all students. And a curriculum was developed which, so far as possible, abstracted the subject matters to be taught from their relationship to conflicting overall points of view. Universities became institutions committed to upholding a fictitious objectivity.
136
The wisdom of a religious believer's reluctance to support the adoption of a collectively imposed vision of the common good does not in any way diminish her duty to engage the culture on the question of the common good, including conceptions informed by faith. As Richard Bellamy puts it, "[w]ithin a pluralist polity, liberalism does not frame democracy, excluding, avoiding or segregating putatively intractable types of value conflict," but simply "informs the democratic spirit through which they are discussed." 137 But the aim is not so much to close out public debate through non-negotiable collective mandates, but to cultivate public debate by more carefully targeting the hearts and minds of the citizenry.
In this regard, Catholic social teaching will always most dramatically display its transformative capacity not through the mechanisms of democracy, but in the life of the human person, a capacity founded on the person's exercise of free will. One unmistakable implication of subsidiarity is that individuals and the communities to which they belong be given space to construct their lives in ways they find meaningful -subject to the foundational determinations on inclusion in human society, as discussed above - order to enforce a singular vision of the good, authentic as that vision might be, but by expanding the liberal project's capacity to tolerate the pursuit of divergent, even illiberal, visions of the good, including their pursuit in contexts where the positive liberty of consumers may be impeded.
Approaching the political and legal spheres via the path of value pluralism allows for the common good to be pursued through relationship, rather than through collective mandates; subsidiarity's promise lies along the same path, for it stands as an invitation to relationship, facilitating the pursuit of truth person by person, community by community.
Subsidiarity calls us not only to support social structures that facilitate personal responses to human need, but to provide those personal responses ourselves. Any political agenda derived from the Church's social teaching must reflect the relational, non-coercive quality of its message, not only out of recognition of the dignity of those who hold divergent conceptions of the good, but also because a pluralist stance may offer the best hope of maintaining the legal viability of the social teaching itself.
